Detention and high-security

Detention and high-security work is where the rules tighten and the stakes multiply. The pathway changes (RGS only, no LBs, tamper-resistant fasteners). The hardware changes (anti-ligature, pick-proof, double-strapped, no grab points). The commissioning changes (every interlock tested, every release tested, every credential workflow tested). Walk into a detention project with the institutional-office playbook and the result is unsafe, non-compliant, and a defect the AHJ will catch. Walk in with the discipline this chapter describes and the install holds up to detention-grade scrutiny.

What makes detention different

The character of the work

Detention environments include holding cells in police facilities, courtrooms with custody cells, provincial and federal correctional facilities, secure psychiatric and forensic units, and immigration detention. The threat model is different from institutional offices: the principal threat is from the protected population itself, the consequences of failure include serious injury or death, and the equipment has to survive deliberate attempt to defeat it.

The three governing principles

Anti-ligature: Every protrusion below 3.7 m (12 ft) AFF is a potential ligature point. Hardware below this height is anti-ligature: smooth, angled, sloped, or otherwise unable to support body weight at any attachment point. Anti-ligature hardware is purpose-built; commercial-grade fixtures do not meet the requirement regardless of how durable they appear.
Pick-proof: Every visible fastener, every sealant, every penetration is attempted-defeat resistant. Standard fire caulk is not pick-proof. Standard Phillips or slot fasteners are not pick-proof. Pick-proof fasteners are tamper-resistant (Torx with security pin, Tri-wing, one-way, or proprietary heads) and pick-proof sealants are detention-grade products specifically tested against picking and gouging.
Double-strapped: Every conduit, every cable support, every fastener doubled. The single point of failure on a commercial install is acceptable risk; on a detention install it is unacceptable. Two clamps per support point, two fasteners per cover, redundant attachment for every device feeding the protected envelope.

Pathway inside the detention envelope

When the rule applies

Every conduit run inside the detention envelope: holding cells, cell corridors, sallyports, prisoner intake, custody-side of any custody door. The pathway-side rules also live in chapter 02; consolidated here for the detention reference.

The spec

// DETENTION PATHWAY

RGS only. EMT, IMC, FMC, LFMC, and PVC are not used inside the detention envelope.
Conduit feeds device boxes from above through the slab where the structure permits, with the device box mounted at 3.7 m (12 ft) AFF or higher to keep it out of reach
Tamper-resistant fastener heads on every conduit support, every box cover, every device cover (Torx with security pin, Tri-wing, or one-way as the project specification calls for)
Conduit body covers (LB, T, C, X) prohibited inside the protected space; junction and pull boxes only with screw-cover and screws inaccessible from the protected side
Caulk and sealant at every conduit penetration: pick-resistant detention-grade sealant. Standard fire-rated caulk is not pick-resistant.
Cable serviced from the secure side of the wall: every device on the prisoner-facing wall is fed by conduit running through the secure-side mechanical chase, with the box opening and the service access on the secure side only
No ceiling-cable or J-hook runs inside the protected space; all cable in conduit, all conduit terminations on the secure side
Double-strap every conduit run inside the envelope: two clamps per support point, with two-hole HDG malleable iron straps replacing single-hole where the project specification calls for it

Field note

Anti-ligature hardware

When the rule applies

Every device installed below 3.7 m (12 ft) AFF inside a holding cell, mental health room, or any space where the institutional clinical assessment requires anti-ligature design. The project specification typically calls out the specific anti-ligature requirement; the integrator’s job is to verify every specified device meets the requirement.

The spec

// ANTI-LIGATURE DESIGN

Anti-ligature hardware purpose-built for the application; commercial equivalents not used regardless of durability rating
No grab points: angled tops on fixtures, sloped enclosures, smooth surfaces
No attachment points: hardware mounted flush, no protrusions, no cord loops, no exposed conduit
Anti-ligature certification: the institutional specification typically references a specific test standard (e.g., the institution’s own anti-ligature acceptance criteria); verify against the listing
Camera housings: anti-ligature dome models specifically rated for detention installation; standard institutional cameras not used in cells
Reader and intercom mounting: flush-mount, anti-ligature, vandal-resistant; sloped face on any reader installed below 3.7 m AFF
Conduit and cable: not exposed below 3.7 m; service from above through the slab, or from the secure side of the wall through a mechanical chase
Light fixtures, plumbing fixtures, ventilation fixtures: all anti-ligature per the architectural specification

Field note

Sallyport interlock and door sequencing

When the rule applies

Every sallyport on the project. A sallyport is a two-door pass-through where only one door can be open at a time; used at vehicle yards, prisoner intake, secure visitor entry, evidence-room entry.

The spec

// SALLYPORT INTERLOCK

Two doors in series, with the interlock logic preventing both doors from being open simultaneously
Interlock implementation::
- Hardware interlock (relay logic): the access control panel uses internal relay logic to enforce the interlock; preferred for redundancy and for offline operation
- Software interlock (panel firmware): the panel’s firmware enforces the interlock through logic blocks; backed up by hardware where the institutional design supports it
Door open during interlock cycle: if Door A is open, Door B remains locked and cannot be commanded open; controller logs the attempt to violate the interlock
Sallyport override: secure override credentials (typically supervisor-level) can disable the interlock under controlled circumstances; override is logged and time-limited
Fire alarm release: per the institutional life-safety design; some institutions release both doors on fire alarm, others release only the egress door
Power outage behaviour: per the institutional design; some institutions fail-secure (both doors locked), others fail to a specified state
Camera coverage: every sallyport has video coverage of both door faces, both door interiors, and the central area; recording priority is high during sallyport cycles
Intercom: bi-directional intercom in the sallyport, communicating to the control room

Commissioning the interlock

Holding cell coverage

When the rule applies

Every cell and every secure detention space. The institutional design specifies the camera count and the coverage requirement; this section describes what good practice looks like across the typical Canadian institutional detention environment.

The spec

// CELL CAMERA COVERAGE

Minimum one camera per holding cell, positioned to view the full interior including the bunk area, the toilet area (with privacy screening as required by the institutional policy), and the door
Camera mounted at 3.7 m (12 ft) AFF or higher, in an anti-ligature housing, fed from the secure side
Resolution: 40 PPF (recognition) minimum on every viewable surface of the cell
Low-light performance: the cell may be in low-light mode at night while still under monitoring; specify camera with IR or starlight-grade sensitivity
Audio recording: per the institutional policy and the privacy framework; most jurisdictions disable audio recording in cells by default, with limited authorised exceptions
Cell corridor coverage: cameras at the corridor ends and at any blind spots, with PPF appropriate to the institutional purpose (recognition or identification)
Tamper-resistant housing and tamper-monitored cable: any attempt to disable the camera reports immediately to the control room

Field note

Courtroom and evidence room work

When the rule applies

Court facilities and evidence rooms have specific access, audit, and video requirements that go beyond general institutional design. Federal facilities and court installations often require FICAM or HSPD-12 compliance, supervised PIV/CAC card reading, and PIN entry through a randomized keypad.

The spec

// COURT AND EVIDENCE ROOM ACCESS

Court holding cells: detention-envelope rules apply (above)
Judges’ chambers and secure office spaces: institutional-grade access with tamper monitoring on the door and the panel
Evidence room: dual-authentication required at the door (card plus PIN, or card plus second card); access log retained per institutional evidence-handling policy
Evidence room video: continuous recording with extended retention (typical 5 to 7 years for criminal evidence rooms); separate VLAN and separate VMS instance from the building general video; storage protected against tamper and against accidental deletion
Evidence-room operator workstation: dedicated workstation in a secure room, single-purpose, no general browsing or productivity software
Federal court facilities: FICAM- or HSPD-12-compliant access where the institutional spec calls for it; supervised PIV/CAC readers; randomized PIN keypad for two-factor
Audit log: every access event, every search of the evidence database, every video review, every credential change recorded and retained per the institutional retention policy

Field note

Wiring topology in detention

When the rule applies

Every cable run inside the detention envelope. Wiring is in conduit on the secure side; nothing visible on the prisoner-facing wall; serviceable from the secure side only.

The spec

// DETENTION WIRING

Every cable in RGS conduit, with the conduit on the secure-side wall or routed through the slab from above
Device boxes flush-mounted on the prisoner-facing wall, with the back of the box opening into the mechanical chase or the slab cavity
Service access (box cover, cable splicing, terminal access) only from the secure side
WAGO 221 lever-action connectors at the device-box service splice on the secure side
Cable identification: per chapter 06, with the labels on the secure-side accessible position; do not place labels inside the prisoner-facing space
Cable type: standard Cat 6A and security signal cable inside the conduit (the conduit and the secure-side service is the security; the cable itself does not have to be detention-rated)
End-of-line resistors at the sensor end of every supervised loop (chapter 15); EOL inside the device or junction box accessible from the secure side only

Commissioning detention installations

When the rule applies

Every detention project. The commissioning checklist includes everything from chapter 22 plus the detention-specific verifications below.

The spec

// DETENTION COMMISSIONING VERIFICATIONS

Sallyport interlock tested in every state with the institutional security team witnessing
Every door release tested: fire alarm release, panic release, emergency release, supervisor override
Every camera tested: live view, recording, low-light mode, tamper alarm, IR or starlight performance
Every reader tested: valid credential, invalid credential, after-hours schedule, two-factor flow where required, ScramblePad randomization (if installed)
Every intrusion zone tested: alarm, restoration, tamper, fault, EOL supervision
Every anti-ligature device walked clinically with the institutional clinical or operational team to verify no grab points
Pick-proof sealant inspected at every penetration with the institutional security team
Tamper-resistant fasteners verified at every cover, junction box, and conduit support
Audit log: 24-hour audit log review at commissioning confirming every event was captured and recorded
Annual inspection plan handed over to the institution: who inspects, how often, against what checklist

// THE PRACTITIONER POSITION

Detention is where the rules tighten and the stakes multiply. RGS conduit only, no LBs, tamper-resistant fasteners, pick-proof detention-grade sealant at every penetration. Anti-ligature everywhere below 3.7 m AFF, with the institutional anti-ligature spec as the governing reference. Sallyport interlocks tested in every state at commissioning. Cell coverage with anti-ligature cameras at 40 PPF minimum, fed from the secure side, with audio policy per the institutional privacy framework. Evidence and court facilities with dual-authentication, FICAM compliance where required, and Hirsch ScramblePad for high-security PIN entry. Service every device from the secure side; the prisoner-facing wall is smooth, anti-ligature, and unbroken. Walk into a detention project with this discipline and the install holds up to detention-grade scrutiny.